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Philosophy of Mental Time — A Theme Introduction
Lajos Brons∗ and Takashi Iida∗∗
The notion of “mental time” refers to the experience and awareness of time,
including that of past, present, and future, and that of the passing of time. This
experience and awareness of time raises a number of puzzling questions. How do we
experience time? What exactly do we experience when we experience time? Do we
actually experience time? Or do we infer time from something in, or some aspect of
our experience? And so forth.
These and many related questions in the “philosophy of mental time”, the topic
of this special issue of the Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Sci-
ence, are not purely philosophical questions. Or at least, they are not likely to be
satisfactorily answered by philosophers alone. Rather, they also need the input of
neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, linguists, and others. And conversely, ans-
wers to these questions may have implications outside the scope of philosophy. The
papers in this special issue illustrate this inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the
philosophy and science of mental time. In this theme introduction, we want to give
a few more examples to illustrate this interdisciplinarity, but also to point out that
much of the field is still wide open—that is, these illustrations raise more questions
than answers.
What do we experience when we experience the present? Many different theories
have been proposed to answer this question, but they can be classified into two main
groups: extensional and non-extensional theories. Theories in the first group assume
that the experienced present has duration; those in the second assume that it doesn’t.
There are substantial differences between the theories within those two groups, but
we’ll ignore those differences here.
According to extensional theories, we are conscious of short periods of time,
often called the “specious present” after William James (1890). The positing of a
specious present is usually defended by the claim that we are conscious of movement
and of multiple notes of a melody in a single act of consciousness. According to non-
extensional theories, on the other hand, the present has no duration. This doesn’t
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necessarily imply that our experience of time is continuous, however. In either kind
of theory the experience of time may be discrete and sequential—somewhat like a
sequence of movie frames.
The two kinds of theories are not necessarily incompatible either—they may ap-
ply to different aspects of our experience and processing of time (or temporality, or
something similar). Much processing by our sensory systems and brains takes place
before something reaches conscious experience, and it is not prima facie impossible
that different steps or phases in that process resemble different theories of temporal
consciousness. Of course, the notion of temporal consciousness implies that these
theories refer to the last, conscious stage in that process only, but earlier stages may
restrict that last stage in important ways, and it is, moreover, not completely clear
whether all of the proposed theories of the experience of the present are indeed about
conscious experience. For example, even if our direct, unprocessed sensing is a bit
like a sequence of movie frames (as in the cinematic theory), we are not conscious of
such a rapid succession of atomic experiences, but only of the continuous stories our
mind concoct to connect those “frames” in a coherent fashion. If something like this
is right, then our pre-conscious, bare sensing would be discrete, but our conscious
awareness continuous, and therefore, different theories explain pre-conscious sensing
and conscious awareness of the present.
Neuroscience and psychology suggest that something like this might be the case
indeed, but before we turn there, let’s briefly address the question whether these dis-
crete, bare sensings (as they are pre-conscious, they cannot be called “experiences”)
have duration. Again, non-extensional theories argue that they don’t, while exten-
sional theories claim that they do. Arguments for the “specious present” and against
durationless conscious experience as assumed by non-extensional theories typically
appeal to our conscious experience of movement as movement (rather than as as a
series of different locations) and musical sequences. Such arguments rely heavily on
introspection, but it is by no means clear that this is a reliable source of information.
It is at least in principle possible that much of our temporal consciousness is con-
structed or even illusory. The mind is much more opaque than commonly assumed
(e.g. Carruthers 2011).
There is a much more fundamental objection against durationless experience,
however; namely, that it is physically impossible. Sound (we hear), light (we see),
and temperature (we feel) all require time. There is no sound at a (durationless)
point of time, nor light (and certainly not light of a particular color), or temperature.
Sound, light, temperature, and many of the other “things” we sense require duration.
A sensation of any of these must have some duration. These bare sensings can have
a very short duration, however, and their lengths may very well differ between sense
modalities.
Recent research by neuroscientists suggests that our visual sensory system pro-
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duces sequential, discrete samples with a length of 50 to 100 ms (i.e. at a sampling
rate between 10 to 20 Hz; e.g. Dubois & VanRullen 2011; Kitazawa 2013), but a
quick probe of some of the literature on the topic teaches that there are various other
closely related sampling rates and that sampling rates may differ from person to per-
son and from occasion to occasion. In any case, 50 to 100 ms is much shorter than
the supposed length of conscious blocks that are typically assumed in extensional
theories of temporal consciousness. The supposed duration of the “specious present”
is around 1 s, for example (i.e. 10 to 20 times longer). And there is (at least) one
other puzzling fact that somehow needs to be taken into account: patients suffering
from motion blindness have conscious visual experience that is sequential and discrete
at a significantly lower rate (around 6 Hz; see Hess, Baker, & Zihl 1989).
Could this mean that the sensory samples (of 50 to 100 ms) are first grouped
into longer, semi-conscious units of 150 to 200 ms, which then are collected at a next
level in longer specious-present-like “blocks”? Perhaps; or perhaps not. The point in
asking this question here is mainly to illustrate that figuring out what our experience
of the present really is like is not just a problem for philosophy, but for psychology
and neuroscience as well, and that it is unlikely that any of these areas can find a
complete and satisfactory answer on its own.
Some scientists and philosophers have suggested that the languages we speak
influence our experience and perception of time. This is a controversial topic, how-
ever, but much of the controversy is as interesting as the topic itself. Probably the
best known controversy with regards to mental time and language is the Hopi Time
Controversy. The “standard” view of that controversy seems to be something like the
following: On the basis of insufficient evidence, Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) claimed
that Hopi lacks words and grammar referring to time, and that because of that, Hopi
speakers have no concept of time, but Ekkehart Malotki (1983) showed that Hopi does
have tense and words referring to time, and that Hopi speakers do have a concept of
time.
There are several flaws in this story, however. Firstly, as John Lucy (1992) and
others have pointed out, Whorf’s claim wasn’t nearly as extreme as it is usually pre-
sented: he merely claimed that Hopi has a different way of dealing with time and that
Hopi speakers have a different conception of time. Secondly, the tenses that Malotki
identifies in Hopi are more like a realis/irrealis distinction—and thus modality—than
like tense (e.g. Comrie 1984). And thirdly, David Dinwoodie (2006) has pointed out
some serious methodological problems in Malotki’s research and argues convincingly
that Malotki failed to support his claim that Hopi speakers have the same conception
of time as speakers of English. If we discard the strawman arguments and method-
ologically flawed studies, we are left with almost (?) nothing. Perhaps, Hopi speakers
have (or had) a (subtly) different conception of time, and perhaps this is because
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of a linguistic difference, or perhaps they don’t (and didn’t), but for now there is
insufficient reliable evidence for either view.
There is evidence that language influences thought and ways of perceiving the
world, although the effects are generally much more subtle than what some philoso-
phers once believed. Speakers of a language that employs cardinal directions rather
than the left/right distinction, for example, always have to pay attention to their
spatial orientation. And asking an adult speaker of such a language whether she can
point north is about as insulting as asking an adult speaker of English whether he
can tie his shoe laces.
One of the most influential theories of a supposed grammar-based influence of
language on thought is the Mass Noun Thesis, the idea that languages that lack
articles and plurals only have mass nouns and, therefore, that speakers of those lan-
guages perceive the world as consisting of stuffs rather than of objects. Both of us
have argued against aspects of the Mass Noun Thesis elsewhere (Iida 1998; Iida in
press; Brons 2014), and the thesis—at least in its extreme form—is almost certainly
false, but there is some evidence that the lack or presence of articles and plurals in a
language subtly but statistically significantly influences the classification of ambigu-
ous cases by children as either objects or stuffs (Imai & Gentner 1997). And there is
an interesting analogy between that case and the Hopi time case.
In case of the Mass Noun Thesis, interpreters with a two-category language and
folk-ontology (with objects and stuffs) attributed a one-category language and folk-
ontology (with just stuffs) to some others. Upon closer inspection, it turned out
that those interpreted others also have a two-category folk-ontology, and that the
difference between the interpreters’ and the others’ conceptual schemes is merely a
difference of the relative “gravitational pull” of the two categories: the interpreters
have folk-ontologies that very slightly gravitate towards classification as objects in
ambiguous cases; while the interpreted others have folk-ontologies that very slightly
gravitate towards classification as stuffs.
In case of the conceptualization of time, the two competing models are linear
and cyclical time, and interpreters that have both conceptions of time attribute a
one-conception-of-time view with just cyclical time to some others. That speakers of
English have a cyclical conception of time in addition to a linear conception follows
from the fact that there is nothing peculiar about talking about “the return of spring”
or saying that “it will be Christmas again next year”1. As in the case of the Mass
Noun Thesis, the perceived difference between interpreter and interpreted other is
probably exaggerated2; that is, the interpreted other has both conceptions of time
1 For other evidence for the cyclical conception of time in case of native speakers of
English, see Chrysikou & Ramey (2006).
2 And like the Mass Noun Thesis, this is probably an example of “othering”, the con-
struction of a essential division between self and other or in-group and out-group by
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(like the interpreter), and the difference is merely one of focus or “gravitational pull”.
Dominant spatial construals of time appear to be universally linear—although not
necessarily straight, and there is considerable other variation—which suggest that
linear conceptions of time are universal as well.
If there is a single decisive factor in the gravitation towards cyclical or linear
conceptualizations of time, then that factor probably is the context of discourse. If
that context is seasonal or otherwise focused on recurring events (such as rituals),
then—most likely—a cyclical conceptualization of time is brought to the foreground,
while in relevant other contexts a linear conceptualization dominates. Perhaps, this
explains the different findings by the linguist Malotki and the anthropologist Din-
woodie in the Hopi case (see above). The difference in focus between anthropological
and linguistic research may lead the research subjects to foreground a different con-
ception of time. All of this is rather speculative, of course, but our aim here (again)
is to illustrate interdisciplinarity (in this case involving linguistics, psychology, and
anthropology, as well as sociology of science) and to raise questions.
We do not experience the future, of course, or not yet, at least. But we certainly
have attitudes towards the future, and we are aware that we have a future and that it
is going to end some day—that is, that we are going to die. The awareness of death
appears to play an important role in moral motivation (e.g. Brons 2016), but the
projection of ourselves into the future may have broader ethical implications.
Utilitarians believe that the rightness or wrongness of an act at least partially
depends on how much suffering it causes, but suffering plays a central role in many
other moral theories and in common sense morality as well. Suffering is a somewhat
ambiguous notion, however. Outside Buddhism3, the concept of suffering is most
central in medicine and nursing, so that would be an obvious place to look for in-
sight. The dominant understanding of suffering in the medical and nursing literature
distinguishes suffering from pain and is based on Eric Castell’s definition of suffering
“as the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of
a person” (1982: 640; 1991: 33)4.
Interestingly, in the case study that Castell uses to introduce and illustrate his
argument he writes that the patient “feared the future” (1982: 639). Indeed, suffer-
interpreting the other as inferior and or radically alien. See Brons (2014) on the Mass
Noun Thesis as an example of othering and Brons (2015) for an analysis of othering
in general.
3 It is controversial whether “suffering” is a good translation of the Buddhist core con-
cept of dukkha, but it remains the most common translation.
4 Although this definition is widely accepted in theoretical work (and purported refuta-
tions are really just amendments), actual medical practice is more often informed by
an identification of suffering with observable indicators of pain, or by medical workers’
preconceptions of what circumstances would count as resulting in suffering.
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ing is a kind of fear more than a kind of pain. “Suffering occurs when an impending
destruction of the person is perceived” (1982: 640; 1991: 33). Castell’s conception
of a “person” is a self-concept. It is the sum-total of the “things” (in the broadest
possible sense) that matter to someone: life, body, relations, roles, self-images, and
so forth. The perception of the impending destruction (of a part) thereof involves a
projection of the self into the future. Suffering, therefore, is a kind of fear associated
with self-projection into an undesirable future. And since projection of oneself into
the future is a kind of mental time travel, this means that the ability to suffer depends
on the ability of mental time travel.
If this is right, then it has obvious implications for animal ethics (and possibly
also for moral questions with regards to infants). If moral status depends on the
ability to suffer, as famously argued by Jeremy Bentham (1789), for example, then
the moral status of animals (and infants) depends on their ability to suffer. And the
ability of an animal to suffer (in addition to the ability to feel pain, which may also
be morally relevant) depends on its ability of mental time travel. By implication,
answering the question whether some kinds of animals have the ability of mental
time travel matters a great deal to how we relate to, and how we should treat those
animals.
Answering that question is not easy, however—not just because of experimental
difficulties, but mostly because there is a further conceptual issue: it is not exactly
clear what it means to project oneself into the future (or the past), and especially
how sophisticated and/or articulate the projected self-concept needs to be5. Cameron
Buckner (2013) has pointed out that philosophers and scientists have a tendency to
assume a lot about human cognitive abilities (often based on introspection) while
demanding ever stronger evidence for the capabilities of animals. As already pointed
out above, our minds are not as transparent (to ourselves) as many of us believe, how-
ever (e.g. Carruthers 2011), and our beliefs and concepts including our self-concepts
may not be as sophisticated as we’d like to think either. Demanding the conceptual
sophistication we think we have from animals before considering to attribute them
the ability of mental time travel is an example of the kind of “anthropofabulation”
Buckner argues against.
Again, our aim here is not to answer difficult philosophical questions, but to
illustrate the inherent multi- or interdisciplinarity of the study of mental time. As
in the previous two examples, different sciences and branches of philosophy need to
work together to find answers. Much the same applies to the papers in this special
issue. In those as well, insights from neuroscience, psychology, physics, and so forth
are employed in attempts to shed some light on philosophical questions. And con-
5 Perhaps the ability to fear is sufficient. Fear requires at least some rudimentary self-
concept and projection of that self into the future, and there are many animals that
appear to be capable of fear or something that looks very much like it.
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versely, we hope that these attempts will also somehow help those working on related
questions in other branches of science dealing with mental time. As the three cases
in this introduction illustrated, there still is plenty to explore.
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